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ABSTRACT
In traditional models, votes are an expression of preferences and beliefs. Psychological theories of
cognitive dissonance suggest, however, that behavior may shape preferences. In this view, the very
act of voting may influence political attitudes. A vote for a candidate may lead to more favorable
interpretations of his actions in the future. We test the empirical relevance of cognitive dissonance
in US Presidential elections. The key problem in such a test is the endogeneity of voter choice which
leads to a mechanical relationship between voting and preferences. We use the voting age restrictions
to help surmount this difficulty. We examine the Presidential opinion ratings of nineteen and twenty
year olds two years after the President's election. Consistent with cognitive dissonance, we find that
twenty year olds (who were eligible to vote in the election) show greater polarization of opinions
than comparable nineteen year olds (who were ineligible to vote). We rule out that aging drives these
results in two ways. First, we find no polarization differences in years in which twenty and nineteen
year olds would not have differed in their eligibility to vote in the prior Presidential election. Second,
we show a similar effect when we compare polarization (for all age groups) in opinions of Senators
elected during high turnout Presidential campaign years with Senators elected during low turnout
non-Presidential campaign years. Thus we find empirical support for the relevance of cognitive
dissonance to voting behavior. This finding has at least three implications for the dynamics of voting
behavior. First, it offers a new rationale for the incumbency advantage. Second, it suggests that there
is an efficiency argument for term limits. And finally, our results demonstrate that efficiency may
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While models of voting behavior vary considerably, one common assumption of models of both
turnout and voter choice is that voting behavior is an expression of preferences or beliefs. Whether
voters are motivated by a desire to shift the outcome of the election to their desired outcome, as
in instrumental models, or by the desire to express strong feelings on the part of themselves or
of their group, as in intensity and popularity models respectively, economic models assume that
preferences are a variable in the voting decision equation. (See for example Aldrich, 1993; Coate
and Conlin, 2004; Grossman and Helpman, 2001 and Matsuaka and Palda, 1999 for summaries
of voter turnout models.) Psychologists on the other hand have highlighted that causation may
also run in the opposite direction: actions themselves may drive preferences and beliefs. Numerous
experiments have led to the conclusion that behavioral change may precede attitudinal change
(Bandura, 1989). One explanation for the impact of behaviors on beliefs is cognitive dissonance
(Festinger, 1957) which refers to one’s internal need for consistency. If an individual performs an
activity that is antithetical to his beliefs, the individual may unconsciously change his beliefs to
alleviate the discomfort of having inconsistent attitudes and actions.1
For example, in a classic experiment (Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959), subjects were asked to
perform for an hour the boring task of placing knobs on pegs, turning them, and then taking the
pegs oﬀ again. After the task was completed, each experimental subject was told that that the
research assistant had not shown up and that the scientists needed the subject’s help in recruiting
more participants. Subjects were told they would receive either $1 or $20 ($6 or $122 in 2004
dollars) for their assistance. After each subject convinced the new recruit, really a confederate of
the experiment, that the task was fun, the subject was asked for a rating of how much s/he truly
enjoyed the experiment. Those who were paid $1 rated the task much more favorably than those
who were paid $20. The theory of cognitive dissonance explains the result by assuming that most
1This impact of behavior on attitudes is most commonly known as cognitive dissonance, which is also how we
will refer to it. Psychological research on the other hand has shown that several other mechanisms besides the one
emphasized by a narrowly deﬁned cognitive dissonance theory could produce a similar eﬀect. For example, self-
perception theory (Bem, 1967) provides a second explanation for the impact of behaviors on beliefs: Individuals infer
their opinions from their own actions. The publication of the 1967 article sparked great debate. ”But as evidence
began to accumulate that dissonance was indeed an unpleasant state of arousal, self-perception theory began to wane
as an explanation for dissonance phenomena.” (Hogg and Cooper, 2003). We continue to use the phrase cognitive
dissonance, however, simply because of its use in common parlance, and not to signify a position on which speciﬁc
psychological mechanism may be at work.
2people believe themselves to be truthful unless they have strong incentives to behave otherwise.
Those who were told they would receive $20 had a strong incentive to lie. Those who were told
they would receive $1 had no such incentive. Therefore those in the $1 group felt the discomfort
(dissonance) of having inconsistent actions (lying to new recruit) and beliefs (I am a truthful person
and the task was really boring). Unable to change the past action of telling the new recruit that
the task was enjoyable, those in the $1 group had no other option but to change their belief that
the task was boring to believe that the task was, in fact, enjoyable.2
In the intervening years, empiricists have discovered that dissonance can be aroused even when
behaviors are in line with attitudes. Aronson et. al (1991) had college students create videos
to encourage high school students to practice safe sex. Some of these students were then asked
to think about their own failures to use condoms in the past. For this group of students, the
discrepancy between their past behavior and the message they were currently preaching appears
to have aroused dissonance. Members of this group stated greater intentions to use condoms in
the future.3 Dissonance is not limited to cases in which subjects are trying to persuade others.
Since the 1959 study, empiricists have explored the relevance of cognitive dissonance to a large
variety of contexts including socialization of children, curing snake phobias, interpersonal attraction,
proselytizing, gambling and water conservation (Aronson, 1999). Applying cognitive dissonance to
the context of voting, two years after an election a citizen who voted for a candidate may hold a
favorable opinion of that politician in part to avoid the internal discomfort of having voted for a
person for whom the individual has a poor opinion.4 Suggestive evidence that dissonance applies
in the voting context comes from Besley and John (2001). Using the National Election Study,
the authors demonstrate that those who report voting in the Presidential election show greater
polarization in their ratings of the two candidates immediately after the election than immediately
before (as compared to those who do not report having voted). Clearly, the endogeneity of the
voting decision (and the reporting of the voting decision) leaves us unable to treat these results
as evidence of a causal link between voting and increased polarization. Suppose that in December
2Because the idea of being a truthful person was a longer held and probably more fundamental part of a person’s
self-perception, it was likely easier for subjects to change opinions of the experiment than of their own veracity.
3The treatment group not only had greater intentions, they also had greater behavioral changes in condom use.
(Stone et. al, 1994).
4These processes may be reinforced by social networks. Individuals may ﬁnd it hard to renounce a position that
they have not only voted in accordance with, but also announced publicly, previously.
32004 we compare two Republicans, both of whom favored Bush in the 2004 election, but only
one of whom actually turned out to vote. Let’s call them Persons V (voter) and N (non-voter).
It would not be surprising to observe, even under the traditional purview, that Person V had a
more positive opinion of Bush than Person N. If probability of turnout is increasing in intensity of
preference and preferences linger, such a correlation would arise nearly mechanically. Thus, in our
test of the relevance of cognitive dissonance to voting behavior, our identiﬁcation strategy must
rely on variables that impact turnout but that are independent of voter preferences.
The age restriction on voting is one such variable. Consider two individuals in 1996 who both
support Clinton and who are seventeen and eighteen years old respectively. Let’s call them Persons
O (older) and Y (younger). The eighteen year old is able to express his support of Clinton at the
polls, whereas the seventeen year old is not. Suppose now we examine their views of Clinton in
1998 when his approval ratings had fallen. Traditional models predict no systematic diﬀerences in
the trends in views of these two persons. On the other hand, cognitive dissonance theory would
lead us to believe that Person Y (now 19) would show a greater fall in his Clinton approval rating
than Person O (now 20). Person O having made a concrete act of commitment to Clinton, through
voting, would ﬁnd it harder to walk away from that position. In contrast, if the two had been Dole
supporters in 1996, the psychological model would predict a diﬀerent pattern of change, from before
to after the election. Cognitive dissonance theory would now predict that Person O would show
the larger decline in Clinton approval, jumping on information that supported his previous action,
whereas Person Y would show a smaller decline viewing new information in a more moderated
way. This logic implies a fairly simple prediction: voting eligibles should show greater post-election
polarization than voting ineligibles.
We test this prediction using data from US elections from 1976 to 1996. Our independent vari-
ables are individuals’ ratings of Presidential performance, gathered two years after each Presidential
election in the National Election Study. Our sample consists of young people who were eligible to
vote in the previous election (20 and 21 year olds) as well as those who were ineligible (18 and 19
year olds). We compare the polarization (by party) of these two groups in their attitudes towards
the President. For a variety of attitudinal measures, we ﬁnd a great deal of increased polarization.
Eligible youth are nearly twice as polarized as ineligible ones.
We examine a second source of exogenous variation in voter turnout. Senatorial elections vary
4greatly in turnout depending on whether they are held in Presidential or interim election years. For
voters of all ages, we compare attitudes towards Senators based on the year in which the Senator
was most recently (re)elected. We again ﬁnd diﬀerential polarization by party. Attitudes towards
Senators elected in Presidential years are roughly 22% more polarized than towards Senators elected
in non-Presidential years.5
Before concluding that these results demonstrate the relevance of cognitive dissonance theory
to voter turnout, we ﬁrst consider the relevance of three potentially confounding factors. First, our
results may be driven by age-induced polarization. Perhaps, older Americans have more divergent
views.6 The Senatorial results demonstrate that aging cannot explain all of our results. We
further test the aging hypothesis directly in two ways. First, we compare 20 and 21 year olds
to 22 and 23 year olds, thus comparing diﬀerent age groups all of whom were eligible to vote
in the previous Presidential election. In contrast to the age induced polarization hypothesis, we
ﬁnd greater polarization among the younger group than the older. However the diﬀerence is not
statistically signiﬁcant. In a second placebo test we focus on Presidential election years, comparing
opinions of 18 and 19 year olds to those of 20 and 21 year olds. Neither of these groups was eligible
to vote for the sitting President. Again, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in polarization between
groups. These results suggest that our ﬁndings are not due merely to aging.
Second, we consider the possibility that our results are biased by the fact that party is mea-
sured at the same time as the attitudinal surveys are conducted. Perhaps a respondent’s positive
(negative) feelings about the President lead her to report herself as a member (not a member)
of the President’s party. To address the potential endogeneity of party report, we instrument for
hypothetical vote in prior election year with individual characteristics. Results are qualitatively
unchanged.
Finally, we consider that increased polarization may be driven by information rather than
dissonance. Perhaps those who vote collect more political information in future years. If they
interpret this information in a manner that is favorable to their candidate, as conﬁrmatory bias
5That this eﬀect is smaller than our ﬁndings using age eligibility may be due to the fact that the impact of our
exogenous voting variable is smaller. In our data, in Presidential elections, those below the age restriction vote at a
rate of 0%, while 46% of 18 and 19 year olds vote. The diﬀerence in turnout between Presidential and non-Presidential
election years is only 15 percentage points, 67 and 52 percent respectively. Turnout percentages are calculated using
the National Elections Survey’s voter veriﬁcation survey conducted in 1976, 1978, 1980, 1984, 1986, 1988 and 1990.
6This would be consistent with (Converse, 1969) evidence that partisanship is increasing in length of membership
in party.
5would suggest (Lord, Ross and Lepper, 1979) they will show increased polarization. To test this
hypothesis, we examine knowledge and interest in politics for eligible and ineligible youth. We ﬁnd
no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in levels of knowledge or interest, suggesting that interest and information
are not the mechanism driving the link between voting and increased polarization.
As a whole, these results suggest the practical importance of cognitive dissonance theory for the
political arena.7 This ﬁnding has at least three implications for how we think about the dynamics
of voter turnout. First, dissonance suggests a new explanation for incumbency advantage. Second,
this theory provides an eﬃciency argument for term limits. Finally, a dissonance model suggests
that future electoral eﬃciency may be decreasing in present turnout. Outside of voting, dissonance
may be relevant to other political behaviors as well. For example, mandatory community service
for high school students may lead to greater compassion for disadvantaged persons.
In the remainder of the paper we present our results more formally. In Section 2, we discuss
the data and methodology. Results that exploit the voting age regulations are presented in Section
3. Results that exploit the variation in turnout between Presidential and non-Presidential years
are shown in Section 4. Section 5 concludes by discussing the implications of our results for
understanding turnout dynamics.
2 Empirical Methodology and Data
The core hypothesis we would like to test is that voting for a particular candidate today increases
one’s opinion of that candidate in the future. The key diﬃculty in testing this theory is that
causality also surely runs in the other direction as well. Individuals who have stronger feelings
about a particular candidate are more likely to vote. Moreover, conditional on voting, individuals
who have more positive feelings about Candidate A are more likely to vote for Candidate A. This
reverse causality means that it would be unsurprising to ﬁnd a positive correlation between voting
for a candidate and feelings for that candidate in the future.
To address this concern we need an exogenous factor that drives voters to vote and is unrelated
to their preferences at the time. We identify two such factors. The ﬁrst is age. Only individuals
who have reached the age of 18 on Election Day may cast a ballot. The second is the timing of
7Akerlof and Dickens (1982) discuss the potential applications of dissonance theory to social security, innovation
and advertising. Rabin (1994) considers the implications of cognitive dissonance for eﬀorts to promote social change.
6the election. Turnout is higher in Presidential elections than in interim elections. Thus there are
exogenous shifts in turnout for congressional elections.
2.1 Age Restrictions
During the time frame of our study (1976-1996) the minimum voting age in the United States
was 18. Only individuals who reached their 18th birthday by the date of the election were eligible
to vote. Those who were 17 or under on that day were ineligible. This discontinuity allows us
to compare the opinions of ineligible and eligible voters two years after the election. Dissonance
theory predicts that eligible voters will show more polarization in their opinion of the candidate
than ineligible voters.
An empirical problem in implementing this strategy is that we must impute which candidate an
ineligible voter would have voted for had they voted. We, therefore, examine polarization by party
aﬃliation for eligible and ineligible voters.8 Such a procedure is sensible since party identiﬁcation
strongly predicts voter choice (Keith et. al, 1992 and Miller and Shanks, 1996).
Empirically, we estimate an equation of the form:
Opinion of Presidentit = a + bEligiblei(t−1) + cPartyi + d(Eligiblei(t−1) ∗ Partyi) + it. (1)
Here the variable “Opinion of President” is a rating of respondents’ feelings toward some aspect
of the President’s leadership. The variable “Eligible” indicates that the respondent was eligible to
vote (18 or older on election day) and the variable “Party” is a dummy for whether the political
party of the respondent and the President coincide. Thus we would expect the coeﬃcient c to be
positive since politicians are typically viewed more favorably by members of their own party. The
interaction term “Eligible*Party” is our independent variable of interest. Cognitive dissonance
theory says that those who were old enough to vote and did in fact vote for the elected oﬃcial
in period t-1 should have a higher opinion of the oﬃcial in period t. A positive and signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient d would support this theory.
Our data are drawn form the National Election Study (NES), a survey of the political behaviors
and opinions of a cross-section of voting age Americans conducted in the fall of even numbered years.
8Note that we apply this procedure uniformly between eligible and ineligible voters. In other words, we would not
use (even if it were available) who the eligible voters voted for.
7As Presidential elections occur every four years, the NES provides data from both Presidential and
interim election years. We focus on non-Presidential election years, comparing those who were
eligible to vote in the prior election to those who were ineligible.9 Our sample period is from 1978
to 2000;10 therefore we have six non-Presidential election years of data.
The great advantage of the NES is its multitude of questions on individuals’ opinions of elected
oﬃcials. In our basic regressions, we restrict our focus to opinions of Presidents. Our main depen-
dent variable is a thermometer question which asks respondents to rate their feelings regarding the
President on a scale from 0 to 100. Other questions are more speciﬁc and more crudely measured.
The NES asks respondents to rate on a scale from 1 to 4 the extent to which they agree that the
President is inspiring, is knowledgeable, is moral, is a good leader, is caring, earns your approval
in general and earns your approval in his handling of the economy. The NES asks respondents
whether they agree (yes or no) with the statement that the President makes you afraid, angry,
hopeful and proud and whether you approve of the President.
Since our identiﬁcation strategy exploits the voting eligibility age threshold, we focus on young
people. For greater comparability between eligible and ineligible voters we limit our sample to
individuals whose age places them within two years of voting eligibility. Hence we limit our sample
to individuals aged 18-21 at time t, the non-Presidential year. This sample consists of two groups.
Those who are 18-19 were 16-17 at the time of the election and were ineligible to vote. Those who
are 20-21 were 18 and 19 at the time of the election and were eligible to vote.11
This reduces our sample to 554, of whom 248 were ineligible and 306 were eligible to vote. Table
1 presents the means for the full sample (column 1) and by age group (columns 2 and 3). The two
samples do not diﬀer greatly on observables with the exception of marriage and employment which
are, not surprisingly, increasing in age. Income appears high in the sample because it is a measure
9The cross-sectional nature of the data means that we measure party aﬃliation in the current period and do not
know a person’s party aﬃliation two years prior. This could potentially produce some endogeneity issues if party
aﬃliation is changing in this two year period, an issue we discuss in Section 1. One would have thought that since we
are looking at changes in opinions, the short panels in the NES would be useful. Unfortunately, because those who
are ineligible to vote are too young to be interviewed in the ﬁrst wave of the NES panels, this data cannot be used
with our identiﬁcation strategy.
10The 1974 election is excluded because while individuals voted for Nixon in 1972, he had left oﬃce by November
1974, the survey date. The 1968 election is excluded because of the undersampling of 18-21 year olds in 1970. The
undersampling of young people prior to 1972 in states in which they did not have the franchise prevents us from
exploiting the variation in voting age restrictions across states as an additional source of variation. Elections prior to
1968 are excluded because the NES did not collect the opinion thermometer we use as our key independent variable.
11The small sample of young voters in the NES dictates this window. Larger samples would have allowed us to
simply compare 19 and 20 year olds.
8of household income; some of these young people are still living with their parents. The second
part of Table 1 presents the means of the various measures rating the performance of the President.
The ﬁrst four, the thermometer variables, are ratings of respondents’ overall feelings on a scale
from 0 to 100 for the President, their Congress persons, their Representative and their Senators.12
The remaining outcome variables focus on more speciﬁc aspects of the President’s performance
and attributes. Variables are rescaled as necessary so that a higher rating is more favorable to the
President in power for all outcome measures. Once again the average ratings do not diﬀer between
the two groups.13
In implementing our regression, we will control for the observables listed in Table 1, as well
as state and year eﬀects. We recognize that the impact of observables on one’s opinion of the
President will vary by the political party of the President. For example, males are more likely
than females to support a Republican President during this time period, but less likely to support
a Democratic President (Edlund and Pande, 2002). For this reason we also include a full set of
observables interacted with a dummy for the political party of the President. Standard errors are
clustered by state to allow for possible dependence among voting behavior for individuals within a
state over time. Thus we estimate:
Opinion of Oﬃcialit = at+bEligiblei(t−1)+cPartyi+d(Eligiblei(t−1)∗Partyi)+eXit+gs+ist. (2)
where at and gs are state and year ﬁxed eﬀects and as noted we allow the error term it to be
clustered by state.
2.2 Presidential Year Turnout
Our second test exploits the fact that there is higher turnout in Presidential election years than in
interim election years. Therefore, Americans are more likely to vote for Congress when there is a
concurrent Presidential race. For example, in 2000, Senators elected two years prior (an interim
election year) saw lower turnout in their most recent elections than their colleagues most recently
12The Congress person variable simply pools respondent responses concerning their Representatives and their
Senators. Therefore a single individual may represent up to three observations in our data for this variable: one for
the Representative and up to two times for Senators.
13Comparing the standard deviation in ratings between columns (2) and (3) is not a good test of our theory. Many
other factors may drive overall variance between age groups, which is why we use a regression framework to examine
polarization by party, rather than overall variance. It is still worth noting that for the Presidential elections, where
our regression estimates are strongest, even the overall variance is larger amongst the eligibles.
9elected four years prior (a Presidential election year.) Consequently, cognitive dissonance predicts
more polarization in constituent views of a Senator elected in a Presidential election year over
one elected in a non-Presidential year.14 As before, we focus on party polarization. We therefore
estimate an equation of the form:
Opinion of Senatorijt = at + bElected in Presidential Yearjt + cPartyij (3)
+d(Electedjt ∗ Partyij) + eXit + gs + ijst.
where i indexes individuals, j indexes senators, and t indexes time. The variable “Elected in Presi-
dential Year” indicates that the particular Senator was last elected concurrently with a Presidential
election and “Party” indicates that person i is of the same party as Senator j. As before, at and
gs are state and year ﬁxed eﬀects and we allow the error term ijt to be clustered by state. Once
again we allow the impact of observables to diﬀer by political party by including as controls the
variables listed in Table 2 as well as their interactions with a dummy for political party of the focal
Senator.
Using this sampling frame, we increase our sample size greatly as we may now include all NES
respondents. In fact given that an individual may be represented by up to two Senators who are
not seeking reelection in the focal year, many individuals appear in our dataset twice.15 The great
limitation is that we must focus only on years in which the NES collected the thermometer variable
for incumbent Senators not up for reelection. This reduces our sample to the years 1978-1994,
excluding 1984. However, because we are no longer restricted to interim election years, we are left
with eight years of data.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for this sample. The means (and standard deviations) are
presented in three columns: The ﬁrst provides the statistics for the full sample of 14,192. The second
and third provide statistics for 6954 individuals whose Senators were elected in a non-Presidential
year and 7238 individuals whose Senators were elected in a Presidential year respectively. Once
again, the two samples are quite comparable on observables. Not surprisingly this similarity extends
to marriage and employment in this case where average age diﬀers by less than .25 years between
14We cannot perform the same comparison for Representatives who face election every two years because of lack of
variation in election timing. At any time all sitting Representatives were elected during a Presidential election year
or all sitting Representatives were elected during a non-Presidential election year.
15Clustering the error term by state allows for a lack of independence amongst observations from the same
individual.
10the two groups. The Senate thermometer, a rating of the respondent’s feelings toward the Senator
on a scale from 0 to 100, also shows no diﬀerence in average rating between groups.
3 Results of Age Eligibility Test
In Table 3 we display estimation of equation 2, which compares party polarization for 18 and 19
year olds versus 20 and 21 year olds in our data. The table displays a single regression with controls
for log(income) and dummies for being employed, having graduated high school, being married,
living in an urban area, being in a union and being a homeowner. Also included are dummies
for race, gender, state and year. The ﬁrst column of the table lists the coeﬃcients on the main
eﬀects. Since our identiﬁcation comes, however, from the interaction of Eligibility and Party, we
also include as controls the interaction of all covariates with the Party dummy. The coeﬃcients on
the interacted variables are included in the second column.
The ﬁrst three rows display the primary variables of interest. Recall that “Eligible” is deﬁned
as being 20 or 21 in the sample, which would make the person 18 or 19 in the election year two
years prior. The party variable is deﬁned as “Same Party as President”. So, in 1998, Democrats
would be coded as 1 while Republicans and Independents would be coded as 0. For the 1990 data,
Republicans would be coded as 1 whereas Democrats and Independents would be coded as 0.16 The
coeﬃcient on Party in this Table is 9.914 which indicates that for the ineligibles there is a nearly 10
point diﬀerence in the thermometer between those of the President’s Party and everyone else. As
we see in Table 1, the mean of the Thermometer variable is roughly 59 with a standard deviation
of 24. Thus party aﬃliation represents 40% of the overall standard deviation in the thermometer
variable.
The signiﬁcant interaction term “Eligible*Party” shows that this polarization increases for
those who were eligible to vote. Amongst this population, the members of the President’s Party
are 9.875 points farther apart from everyone else. This suggests that the eligibles are roughly twice
as polarized as the ineligibles. This is consistent with the original hypothesis. The eligibles show
16Allowing party to be represented by two dummies: same party as President and Independent, does not sub-
stantively change our ﬁndings. The Independent interaction enters insigniﬁcantly. We still see that the polarization
of eligibles, by party (now deﬁned as the President’s party versus the opposition party) is nearly twice as large as
amongst ineligibles.
11greater party aﬃliation than those ineligible to vote.17 These magnitudes are large especially when
one accounts for the fact that the eligible voters (18 and 19 year olds) only vote at a 46% rate,
implying that the impact of voting itself twice as big. This suggests the impact of voting alone
would lead voters to be four times as polarized as non-voters.
Both the main eﬀects and interactions of control variables generally enter insigniﬁcantly, with
three exceptions. The black and union coeﬃcients suggest that blacks have signiﬁcantly more
positive views of the incumbent President whereas urban residents have signiﬁcantly more negative
views. The black*party interaction enters negatively and signiﬁcantly suggesting that blacks rate
Presidents of their own party less favorably than do whites (omitted group). Blacks rate Presidents
of an opposing party on average more favorably than white respondents.
This basic table relates eligibility to a broad measure of one’s feelings towards the President. In
Table 4, we examine the impact of eligibility on more speciﬁc attitudinal measures. The broadest
of these twelve measures are the two approval scales: one on general approval and one on the
President’s handling of the economy. More speciﬁc questions ask the respondent to agree or disagree
that the President is inspiring, knowledgeable, moral, a good leader and caring. Respondents are
also asked whether the President makes them angry, afraid, hopeful and proud. We continue to
run regressions of the form of equation 2. We include the same controls and interactions of controls
with the Party dummy as in Table 3. For simplicity, we do not show the coeﬃcients on the controls.
Each Column of each Panel in Table 4 is a separate regression with a diﬀerent dependent variable.
Because not all of the twelve questions were asked in all the years, the sample size diﬀers across
regressions. Moreover, we have redeﬁned negative variables so that they are positive. For example,
Question 7 asks “Does the President make you angry?” We have deﬁned 1 on this question to
be “No” and 0 to be “Yes”. In this way, across all questions, positive or negative, the cognitive
dissonance hypothesis predicts a positive coeﬃcient on “Eligible*party”.
The prediction is borne out: All the coeﬃcients on the interaction terms, except one, are
positive. Both of the two most general questions (the approval ratings) show a signiﬁcant correlation
with “Eligible*Party”. In other words, voting eligibles show more polarized views on these measures
than voting ineligibles. Increased polarization amongst eligibles is also found in nine of the ten more
17Of course, given general aging eﬀects, the main eﬀect of “Eligible to Vote” is not directly interpretable. Suppose
however we assumed that the coeﬃcient solely represented eligibility (and not aging) eﬀects. In this case, the results
could be interpreted as saying that voting eligibility decreases liking by 5.2 for the President amongst those outside
of his party and increases liking by 4.6 for those in his party.
12speciﬁc questions. The interaction is signiﬁcant, however, only in two speciﬁcations: those that ask
whether the President is knowledgeable and a good leader. This loss in signiﬁcance is likely due to
the drastic drop in sample size for these questions. Even with this smaller sample, the magnitude
of “Eligible*Party” is quite large in all of the regressions. If we take the point estimates literally,
we see as before that the polarization for the eligibles is at least twice as large as the polarization
for the ineligibles.
Evidence of cognitive dissonance is not limited to respondent’s many attitudes toward the in-
cumbent President. In a small subsample, we can also perform a similar test for opinions toward
those in Congress. In column (1), we examine respondents’ opinions of all congress people (Rep-
resentatives and Senators) who were elected two years ago. Once again, we compare 18 and 19
year olds’ opinions to 20 and 21 year olds’ opinions.18 The coeﬃcient on “Same Party” is 4.382
and signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Since the mean of the Congressional thermometer is 60 with a
standard deviation of 19, this suggests that the party polarization accounts for 21% of the standard
deviation. The interaction term is signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Its magnitude is large, 5.347, and
suggests that those eligible to vote are more than twice as polarized about their Congress people
as those ineligible to vote.
In columns (2) and (3), we decompose this eﬀect into feelings toward Representatives and
feelings toward Senators. It appears that the bulk of the polarization is coming from respondents’
views of Representatives. Voting eligibles are over four times as polarized as ineligibles in their
opinions of Representatives. The interaction term in column 3 is small, negative and insigniﬁcant
indicating no increased polarization amongst eligibles over ineligibles in views of their Senators.
It is unclear whether these diﬀerences are due to sampling variation or whether they represent
real diﬀerences in how voting drives opinions of Representatives and Senators, respectively.19 The
last column performs the same exercise for Senators who were elected four years ago and compares
individuals aged 20 to 23. Here we ﬁnd evidence of increased polarization amongst eligibles. Though
the magnitude is large, the eﬀect is noisily estimated and insigniﬁcant, however.
18The sample size increases because we can include all years, not only non-Presidential election years. The other
eﬀect is that the same person may appear up to three times, once for their Representative and once for each of their
two Senators. This introduces a correlation which we deal with by allowing for the error term to be correlated within
a state (and therefore within a person). But the congressional opinion questions are not asked in every year, so the
net eﬀect on sample size is small.
19It is unlikely that this is due to some basic feature of opinions about Senators since in Table 10 we see increased
polarization in respondents’ views of Senators.
133.1 Confounds
While we have found evidence of increased polarization amongst eligible voters in both Presidential
and Senatorial elections, there are three potential threats to our conclusion that the evidence
supports the relevance of cognitive dissonance in the political arena. The ﬁrst diﬃculty is that
age*party eﬀects may be driven by age diﬀerences and not voting induced diﬀerences in respondents’
opinions. In other words, perhaps older people simply have more polarized views than younger
people. To test for this possibility, we perform two falsiﬁcation exercises, the results of which are
reported in Table 6. The ﬁrst column of this Table repeats the basic result from Table 3. Each of
the other three columns represents a “placebo” test between two groups who are diﬀerent in age
but not diﬀerent in eligibility to vote. If aging is the primary cause of increased polarization the
“placebo” tests should yield similar results to the basic speciﬁcation in Column 1. If dissonance is
the primary driver, interaction terms in Columns 2 through 4 should show non-positive coeﬃcients.
In the ﬁrst exercise (column 2), we compare 20 and 21 year olds to 22 and 23 year olds, two
years after the Presidential election. As before both groups diﬀer by two years in age, but both were
eligible to vote in the prior election. As we see, these two groups do not show signiﬁcant diﬀerences
in polarization. In fact, if anything the older group is less polarized, though the diﬀerence is not
signiﬁcant. Of course, one could still argue that the polarization eﬀects of aging are concave. It
is possible that much of the increase in polarization happens between nineteen and twenty. This
story is consistent with our large diﬀerences in polarization in Column 1 (which compares 18 and
19 year olds to 20 and 21 year olds) and little or no diﬀerence in polarization in Column 2 (which
compares 20 and 21 year olds to 22 and 23 year olds).
In column (3) we perform a placebo test that is robust to the concave age eﬀects criticism.
Here we compare 18 and 19 year olds to 20 and 21 year olds, exactly the same age groups as in our
basic speciﬁcation. But we now compare their opinions of the incumbent President in Presidential
election years. This implies that four years ago, both groups of young people were ineligible to
vote. This speciﬁcation should uncover the relationship between polarization and aging (free of any
voting eﬀect) for our sample. As shown in column (3), we ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant increase
in polarization of the older group over the younger group. In fact, if anything the negative point
estimates suggests that there is a drop in polarization as individuals age between 18 and 19 and
20 and 21. In column (4) we consider the possibility that the fact that some sitting Presidents
14are eligible to run again while others are not is somehow biasing our results. We repeat this exact
same exercise but without the election years of 1988 and 2000 when the incumbent President(due
to term limits) could not run again. Results are substantively unchanged. In short, these placebo
tests suggest that our results are unlikely to be driven by the eﬀect of aging on polarization.
A second potential confound to our dissonance interpretation is the endogeneity of the party
aﬃliation variable. Recall that we do not have an individual’s party aﬃliation in the Presidential
election year, which is actually two years prior to the survey date. Instead, we use contemporaneous
party aﬃliation, which has potentially changed in the intervening two years. For example positive
feelings toward Ronald Reagan in 1982 could increase the likelihood that a person identiﬁes as a
Republican in that same year.20 To assure that our results are not driven by changing political
identities, we rerun equation 2 substituting self-identiﬁed party with a predicted party variable,
predicted using contemporaneous demographic characteristics. We then include interactions of this
predicted party with a dummy for eligibility exactly as before.21
To create the prediction we consider all respondents (regardless of age) in each presidential
election year. For each election, we regress a dummy for whether the respondent voted for the
winner on log income and dummies for education, employment status, marital status, urban, state,
gender, race, union member and homeowner. For each election, we create two prediction equations,
one that does and one that does not include the party variable because of the variable’s potential
endogeneity. We then use the coeﬃcients from this regression on the data for the subsequent non-
presidential year (t) to predict the likelihood that a respondent voted for the President. These
prediction equations are shown in Table 7a. In columns one to six, we see the basic prediction
equations. In columns seven to twelve, we see how the prediction equations change when Party is
included as a regressor.
We then run the basic regression in equation 2 substituting the predicted vote variable for the
potentially endogenous party variable. Results are reported in Table 7b. For comparison, the ﬁrst
column of this table provides results using the basic speciﬁcation of the form of equation 2, but
excluding the covariates. The results are little changed: The coeﬃcient on both the party main eﬀect
and interaction terms remain statistically signiﬁcant, showing an increased in polarization among
20It is worth noting that for this confound to drive our results, this change in party aﬃliation must be speciﬁc to
the older cohort.
21Given that demographics are used to predict party, it is no longer possible to include these demographics as
control variables. Previous results were robust to the exclusion of the demographic controls.
15eligibles of 62%. The second column relies on a vote variable predicted only using demographics.
Results are similar to the basic speciﬁcation. The main eﬀect shows that those who would have
voted for the President, according to demographics, but were ineligible favor the President on the
thermometer by 22 points more. The same demographic groups who would have voted for the
President but were eligible are an extra 17 points more polarized. This suggests that eligible voters
are 77% more polarized than ineligible voters.
This speciﬁcation has another advantage. We know that not all voters vote along party lines in
an election. The speciﬁcation in Table 7b allows us to rescale the impact of “Party” to account for
this fact. Column (3) of this table, therefore, repeats this exercise including the Party variable as a
predictor of voting behavior. Again, we see a large, positive and signiﬁcant interaction coeﬃcient.
Compared to the direct eﬀect of voting for the President, it appears that Eligible voters are 52%
more polarized.
Table 8 combines the test for the polarization eﬀects of aging with the test for the potential
endogeneity of party. Here we repeat the placebo tests in Table 6 but with the predicted vote
variable in place of the contemporaneous party variable. Despite this change, we see that still none
of the placebos shows a positive, signiﬁcant impact of aging on polarization. In fact, all tests except
one (column 8) point to a negative, though insigniﬁcant, eﬀect of aging.
The third potential confound to our dissonance interpretation is that it is not clear whether
our results are due to cognitive dissonance or information eﬀects. Perhaps those who vote collect
more political information in future years. Conﬁrmatory bias (Lord et. al, 1979) suggests that they
would then interpret that information to favor the candidate for whom they have voted, resulting in
greater polarization among voters.22 This confound need not require active searching of information
by 18 and 19 year olds. Instead parties could be speciﬁcally targeting them. Suppose campaigns
target these “just able to vote” voters eﬀectively. This would result in much greater exposure to
information. If this increased exposure generates increase polarization, this produces an important
confound. To deal with these possibilities, we examine how political knowledge diﬀers by prior
voting eligibility status. Speciﬁcally, we compare how informed and politically active 18 and 19
year olds are relative to 20 and 21 year olds during both presidential and interim election years.
Our dependent variables of interest are speciﬁcally level of political information, interest in the
22Gerber and Green (1998,1999) ﬁnd evidence against conﬁrmatory bias in interpreting information on politician
quality.
16election, interest in public aﬀairs, campaign participation, recall the name of the Representative
and recall the name of the Senator.
In the ﬁrst row of Table 9, we compare knowledge by age solely in non Presidential election
years. Hence we run regressions of the form:
Involvementit = at + bEligibleit−1 + cPartyi + d(Eligibleit−1 ∗ Partyi) + ijst. (4)
where Eligible is a dummy for 20 and 21 years of age. The ﬁrst rows in Table 9 estimate this
regression for diﬀerent measures of ”Involvement”. In other words, this is our standard test of
the impact of aging on polarization but using knowledge and involvement variables as outcomes.
In the second panel, labeled ”Presidential Election Years”, we reestimate the same regression but
only in Presidential years. If the above confound were important, we would expect that knowledge
diﬀerences between 20/21 and 18/19 year olds would be large in non-presidential years. Moreover,
if this eﬀect arises out of campaign targeting or selective attention during campaigns, we would
expect this diﬀerence to be much smaller when we compare 20/21 year olds to 18/19 year olds in
Presidential election years, since both groups were unable to vote in the prior Presidential election.
For none of these questions, do we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the actual comparison and
the placebo comparison.23 For two of these questions, the point estimates, though insigniﬁcant,
show a greater diﬀerence in knowledge in the non-Presidential election years (columns 1 and 4) which
is consistent with the knowledge story. However, for the remainder, if anything, the diﬀerence goes
in the other direction, again insigniﬁcant. The older cohort shows more knowledge, experience and
participation in the election years rather than the non-election years.
These results, especially when combined with the aging results of Table 6 make it hard to
interpret our polarization ﬁndings as due to diﬀerential information or campaign targetting. This
discussion provides some reasons why these confounds are unlikely to drive our results. In the next
section, we turn to a very diﬀerent test of cognitive dissonance. Based on turnout for senatorial
elections, this next test provides a complement to the results of this section.
23Since these regressions are run on separate samples, we can use the individual standard errors on each estimate
to assess signiﬁcance.
174 Presidential Election Year Turnout Results
A second variable that has an impact on voting that is exogenous to intensity of beliefs is whether
or not there is a concurrent Presidential election. Senatorial elections occur both in Presidential
and interim election years. Therefore, Americans are more likely to vote for Congress when there
is a concurrent Presidential race.
In this section, we move to our second test. In Table 10 we estimate equation 3, comparing
party polarization of constituent views of Senators elected in Presidential years with constituent
views of Senators elected in non-Presidential years. Column (1) of Panel A reports the results
from our basic Senatorial regression, which includes the full sample of individuals who are asked
their views of an incumbent Senator not currently seeking reelection.24 The speciﬁcation includes
demographic controls, demographic controls interacted with the Party dummy and state and year
ﬁxed eﬀects.
The coeﬃcient on “Same Party” suggests that members of a Senator’s party rate him 8.9 points
higher than respondents who belong to another Party. The coeﬃcient on “Elected*Party” suggests
that the polarization increases by 23%(2.06/8.9) for Senators elected in a Presidential year. This
increase is smaller than in the prior test. That could be due to the fact that the voter turnout
diﬀerential in this case is smaller than the large diﬀerence in voting between eligible and ineligible
voters.25 It may also be due to some feature of opinions about Senators versus Presidents. In either
case, these results still represent a large, signiﬁcant impact of voting on polarization of political
views.
In columns (2) and (3) of Panel A we estimate this regression separately for Senators elected two
and four years prior. Since a Senator’s term lasts for six years, both groups of Senators will still be in
oﬃce. This split allows us to examine the duration of voting eﬀects on polarization. Results suggest
that the duration is at least four years. In both speciﬁcations a Senator’s own party members rate
him 9 percentage points higher than respondents of other parties. Further those Senators elected
during a Presidential election, when turnout is higher, see an increased polarization in constituency
24In fact some individuals may appear in the sample twice as they are represented by two Senators who are not
currently seeking reelection.
25As we noted earlier, young eligible voters vote at a 46% rate in Presidential elections, so the eligible to ineligible
comparison is a comparison of 46% to 0%. The turnout diﬀerentials for Presidential versus non-Presidential elections
is only 15% (67-52%). Thus we would expect an eﬀect that is only
1




18views of 20 to 22%. However, the increase in polarization is only signiﬁcant at conventional levels
for the four year case.26
4.1 Confounds
One potential confound to the interpretation of this test as evidence of cognitive dissonance is
that Senatorial elections may have a diﬀerent ﬂavor when they occur in Presidential election years.
Perhaps there is more media spotlight on these elections, which increases polarization for reasons
unrelated to voter turnout.27
To test this possibility, we examine a twist on the basic Senatorial speciﬁcation. If the ef-
fect estimated in column (1) of Table 10 is due to diﬀerential voter turnout, then it ought to be
concentrated in the population that tends to turn out in Presidential election years but not in
non-Presidential election years. To investigate whether this is in fact the case, we create for each
respondent a predicted diﬀerence in probability of turnout in Presidential over non-Presidential
years. The prediction is created in the following manner. First, we create two Probit regressions
of turnout on demographics. We create separate regressions for Presidential and non-Presidential
election years. Second, we use the coeﬃcients from these regressions to predict for each individual,
their probability of voting in both Presidential and non-Presidential election years. Finally, we sub-
tract the second estimate from the ﬁrst to obtain the predicted diﬀerence in turnout in Presidential
and interim election years.
In Panel B of Table 10 we re-estimate the speciﬁcation in column (1) Panel A for two diﬀerent
groups. Column (1) is the half of the sample that has a below median diﬀerence in turnout,
whereas column (2) has an above median diﬀerence in turnout. Again if Panel A Column (1)
results are driven by turnout (and not by increased media or some other aspect of Presidential
elections) than we should see that the polarization eﬀect is concentrated in the second group, the
group whose turnout behavior is more greatly impacted by the concurrence of the Presidential and
Senatorial elections. Results in Panel B indicate that both the below and above median diﬀerence
groups show increased polarization of views of Senators elected during Presidential years compared
with views of those elected during interim elections. However, the increase in polarization is only
26We are not able to do this as easily for the Presidential case because Presidents run every four years and are
limited to two terms.
27Of course these media eﬀects would have to persist for four years to explain away our results.
19signiﬁcant for the high diﬀerence group. Further, the magnitude of eﬀect is much larger for the
high diﬀerence group. It is only 14% (1.67/11.39) for the low diﬀerence group, whereas it is nearly
40% (2.429/6.185) for the high diﬀerence group. When unscaled by the base level of polarization,
the diﬀerence in polarization eﬀects between the low and high diﬀerence groups is smaller and
insigniﬁcant. In short, these results are suggestive of an impact of turnout on polarization of
political views.
5 Conclusion
Though each has its limitations, the results of the two estimation strategies together suggest that
the act of voting strengthens future opinions of a candidate. Those who are induced to turnout
either by age eligibility or by a concurrent Presidential election, show increased polarization in their
views toward the candidates two years post-election. Thus we provide direct ﬁeld evidence of the
importance of cognitive dissonance. This ﬁnding has implications for understanding the dynamics
of voter turnout.
Consider a situation where voters vote based on two factors: personal policy preferences and
overall candidate quality. In such a simple world, voters potentially face a tension between voting for
the most eﬀective candidate and the one whose position matches their own. Cognitive dissonance
adds a wrinkle to this tension. Suppose an individual’s perception of candidate quality is colored
by past voting behavior. A citizen who voted for a candidate now perceives the candidate to be of
higher quality. This small change to this simple voting model provides three insights.
First, it suggests a diﬀerent rationale for incumbency advantage.28 Incumbents by deﬁnition,
received more than half the vote. Therefore, they enter the next election with a “boost” in perceived
quality. An objectively equal quality candidate will not have the equivalent boost and therefore
would face an electoral disadvantage.29
28The incumbency advantage has been estimated at about 10 percentage points in recent elections. See for example
Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002)
29While results are too imprecise to quantify the impact of dissonance on voting behavior, suggestive evidence
that dissonance plays a role in the incumbency advantage comes from the fact that during the period 1984 to 2000,
incumbent senators running in non-presidential years (after having last been elected in a high turnout presidential
year) won by larger margins than those running in presidential years. The groups received 66 and 63 percent of the
vote respectively, a diﬀerence that is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Examining the role of dissonance on
voting behavior would be an interesting topic for future work.
20Second, dissonance implies an eﬃciency reason for term limits. Since incumbents face an unnat-
ural “boost” with more than half the electorate, new information regarding their quality will not be
appropriately incorporated. Consequently, there will be an ineﬃcient over-election of incumbents.
This in turn suggests that term limits could help to bring the system closer to eﬃciency.30
Third, this model suggests that high voter turnout in a particular election is not necessarily a
good thing. Even if voters have private information that needs to be impounded to the election,
their turnout could have negative consequences for future elections. High turnout implies that a
bigger body of the electorate will be biased in their judgment of the incumbent. Lower turnout
implies that there will be a larger mass of individuals who will be neutral in future elections.
Beyond eﬃciency, this prediction also implies a relationship between voter turnout and incumbency
advantage in future elections.
30The obvious drawback of such term limits is the usual cost of denying a superior candidate a chance to re-run.
The implicit assumption of the beneﬁt of term limits is that cognitive dissonance applies to a voter’s view of an
individual and not of an entire political party.
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23Table I: Summary Statistics
YEARS:1978-1998 (non-presidential election years)
Sample
Variable Full Ages 18-19 Ages 20-21
High school? 0.982 0.988 0.977
(0.133) (0.110) (0.150)
Income 19542.140 21450.020 17995.890
(17371.270) (18249.100) (16494.530)
log(Income) 9.446 9.535 9.374
(0.976) (1.003) (0.949)
Employed 0.567 0.516 0.608
(0.496) (0.501) (0.489)
Married 0.218 0.153 0.271
(0.414) (0.361) (0.445)
Urban 0.274 0.278 0.271
(0.447) (0.449) (0.445)
Union 0.139 0.173 0.111
(0.346) (0.379) (0.315)
Homeowner 0.417 0.492 0.356
(0.494) (0.501) (0.480)
Age 19.653 18.585 20.520
(1.084) (0.494) (0.500)
Republican 0.325 0.323 0.327
(0.469) (0.468) (0.470)
male 0.482 0.500 0.467
(0.500) (0.501) (0.500)
RACE:
Black 0.143 0.141 0.144
(0.350) (0.349) (0.351)
Hispanic 0.099 0.121 0.082
(0.299) (0.327) (0.274)
Asian 0.014 0.020 0.010
(0.119) (0.141) (0.099)
Native 0.032 0.032 0.033
(0.177) (0.177) (0.178)
Sample Size 554 248 306
NOTES:
1)Data Source is the National Election Studies (NES) Survey
1948-2002 cumulative data set. NES conducts national surveys
of the American electorate in presidential and midterm election
years.
2)The sample shown here is comprised of survey participants
aged 18-21 from the non-Presidential election years from 1978-
1998
3)There is some variation in the exact sample size by variable
due to not all parameters and questions being asked in each
survey year.Table I(cont.): Summary Statistics
YEARS:1978-1998 (non-presidential election years)
Sample
Dependent Variable Full Ages 18-19 Ages 20-21
President Thermometer 59.007 59.423 58.670
(100 point scale) (24.821) (24.360) (25.224)
Congressman Thermometer 59.537 58.965 59.907
(100 point scale) (19.228) (20.597) (18.299)
Representative Thermometer 61.329 60.455 61.879
(100 point scale) (19.713) (20.892) (18.849)
Senator Thermometer 56.784 56.772 56.793
(100 point scale) (18.146) (20.035) (16.806)
Is the President inspiring? 2.621 2.740 2.530
(4 point scale) (0.809) (0.803) (0.808)
Is pres. knowledgeable? 2.992 2.974 3.007
(4 point scale) (0.719) (0.701) (0.736)
Is pres. moral? 2.344 2.327 2.356
(4 point scale) (0.868) (0.839) (0.892)
Is pres. a good leader? 2.779 2.845 2.726
(4 point scale) (0.895) (0.861) (0.921)
Does the President care? 2.527 2.549 2.509
(4 point scale) (0.880) (0.898) (0.870)
Does pres. make you angry? 0.541 0.573 0.517
(2 point scale) (0.499) (0.497) (0.501)
...make you afraid? 0.782 0.803 0.765
(2 point scale) (0.414) (0.399) (0.425)
...make you hopeful? 0.474 0.462 0.483
(2 point scale) (0.500) (0.501) (0.501)
...make you proud? 0.404 0.431 0.383
(2 point scale) (0.492) (0.497) (0.488)
Do you approve of the pres? 0.660 0.688 0.638
(2 point scale) (0.474) (0.464) (0.481)
...approve of the pres? 2.720 2.905 2.562
(4 point scale) (1.106) (1.069) (1.115)
...approve of pres’s 2.137 2.399 1.904
handling of the economy? (1.621) (1.594) (1.614)
(4 point scale)
Sample Size 554 248 306
NOTES:
1)The Congressman Thermometer is the pooled variable of the Repre-
sentative and Senator Thermometers and includes some observations of
the same respondents’ opinion of both his senator and representative.
2)The sample for Senator and Representative Thermometer diﬀers from
the rest of the sample and includes all election years 1978-1994 (ex 1984)
for the senator thermometer and all election years (1978-1998) for repre-
sentatives. The diﬀerent survey questions of presidential approval were
similarly asked of respondents only in particular survey years, so the ac-
tual sample size for each dependent variable has variation. Sample sizes
are implicit in the regression sample sizes.
3)See previous page for additional notes.Table II: Summary Statistics for Senate Sample
YEARS:1978-1994 (ALL election years)
Sample
Variable Full Sample Senator elected Senator elected
in a non-Presidential in a Presidential
Election Year Election Year
High school? 0.928 0.926 0.930
(0.259) (0.262) (0.256)
Income 27728.610 27975.860 27491.060
(18055.350) (18292.930) (17822.150)
log(Income) 9.941 9.948 9.935
(0.849) (0.852) (0.845)
Employed 0.643 0.644 0.643
(0.479) (0.479) (0.479)
Married 0.601 0.603 0.600
(0.490) (0.489) (0.490)
Urban 0.246 0.247 0.245
(0.431) (0.431) (0.430)
Union 0.218 0.220 0.217
(0.413) (0.414) (0.412)
Homeowner 0.695 0.697 0.694
(0.460) (0.460) (0.461)
Age 44.598 44.711 44.490
(16.902) (16.944) (16.862)
Republican 0.377 0.376 0.377
(0.485) (0.484) (0.485)
male 0.472 0.475 0.468
(0.499) (0.499) (0.499)
RACE:
Black 0.100 0.108 0.093
(0.300) (0.310) (0.290)
Hispanic 0.040 0.038 0.042
(0.196) (0.191) (0.202)
Asian 0.010 0.010 0.010
(0.102) (0.102) (0.101)
Native 0.023 0.024 0.022
(0.149) (0.154) (0.145)
Senator Thermometer 58.635 58.582 58.685
(21.845) (21.445) (22.225)
Sample Size 14192 6954 7238
NOTES:
1)Data Source is the National Election Studies (NES) Survey 1948-2002 cumu-
lative data set. NES conducts national surveys of the American electorate in
presidential and midterm election years.
2)The sample shown here is comprised of survey participants who participated in
a series of questions relating to congressional attitudes. The congressional surveys
were not administered in 1984. The sample is further divided into subsamples
of individuals whose senators were last elected (or re-elected) in presidential or
non-presidential election years.
3)There is some variation in the exact sample size by variable due to not all




Eligible to Vote -5.186
(2.757)
Same Party as President 9.914
(3.023)
Controls Own Coeﬃcient Party Interaction
coeﬃcient

























Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes -





1)Data Source is the National Election Studies (NES) Survey 1948-2002
cumulative data set. Sample is survey respondents aged 18-21 from the
non-presidential election years 1978-1998
2)The dependent variable is a “feeling” thermometer (scale 1-100 with
100 being more positive) on the President of the survey year.
3)“Eligible to Vote” is a dummy variable for whether the respondent was
able (by age) to vote in the previous election two years ago and “Same
Party as President” is a dummy matching self-reported political party
aﬃliation to the president’s party.Table V: Voting Eligibility and Congressional Attitudes
Congressman Representative Senator Elected Senator Elected
Elected Elected Two Years Ago Four Years Ago
Two Years Ago Two Years Ago
Eligible*Party 5.347 9.446 -0.449 2.854
(2.939) (4.254) (4.427) (3.505)
Eligible to Vote -1.514 -2.173 0.048 0.866
(1.977) (3.633) (2.743) (3.01)
Same Party as 4.382 2.667 6.295 3.703
Congressman (1.822) (2.995) (3.809) (2.177)
Observations 799 484 315 425
Adjusted R
2 0.21 0.28 0.26 0.35
NOTES:
1)Data Source is the National Election Studies (NES) Survey 1948-2002 cumulative data
set. Sample is survey respondents aged 18-21 who answered the survey subsection on
congressional attitudes from election years 1978-1998. For column 1, the sample is survey
respondents aged 20-23 since this column refers to senators elected 4 years ago.
2)The dependent variable is a “feeling” thermometer (scale 1-100 with 100 being more
positive) on the particular elected representative. In any year j, a particular individual is
asked to rate his or her current representative as well as both of the state’s two senators.
We have uniquely identiﬁed the year of the senator’s last election (either two years ago,
four years ago, or currently facing reelection).
3)The basic speciﬁcation includes year and state ﬁxed eﬀects as well as all demographic
controls used in Table II.
4)“Eligible to Vote” is a dummy variable for whether the respondent was able (by age)
to vote in the previous election two years (or four) ago of their congressman and “Same
Party as Senator (or Representative or Congressman)” is a dummy matching self-reported
political party aﬃliation to the elected oﬃcial’s party.
5)Column 1 is the sample of all congressman (senators and congressmen) elected two years
ago. Column 2 is the sample of individuals’ opinions of their representative. Column 3
is the sample of individuals’ opinions of senators elected two years ago. Column 4 is the
sample of individuals’ opinions of their senator if their senator was elected four years ago.
All regressions are run clustered by state.Table VI: Placebo Tests
BASE Regression PLACEBO Regressions
Time Period Relative to Two Years Post Two Years Post Presidential Presidential
Presidential Election Presidential Election Presidential Election Election Year Election Year
Sample Years: 1978-1998 1978-1998 1980-2000 1980-2000
ex. 1988, 2000
Ages Compared 18,19 vs. 20,21 20,21 vs. 22,23 18,19 vs. 20,21 18,19 vs. 20,21
Eligible*party 9.875 -3.473 -3.359 -5.215
(3.845) (3.296) (4.317) (5.467)
“Eligible to Vote” -5.186 1.372 2.429 3.528
(2.757) (2.436) (3.313) (3.931)
Same Party as President 9.914 18.127 25.858 25.268
(3.023) (2.512) (3.543) (4.598)
Observations 554 695 469 341
Adjusted R
2 0.345 0.348 0.373 0.384
Concept Base Both Groups No election two No election two
Tested: Test Eligible to Vote Years Prior Years Prior
NOTES:
1)Data Source is the National Election Studies (NES) Survey 1948-2002 cumulative data set.
2)The dependent variable is a “feeling” thermometer (scale 1-100 with 100 being more positive) on the
President of the survey year.
3)All regressions include year and state ﬁxed eﬀects as well as all demographic controls used in the basic
speciﬁcation.
4)“Same Party as President” is a dummy matching self-reported political party aﬃliation to the president’s
party.
5)Sample years and age composition vary by regression. The BASE (column 1) is comprised of those aged
18-21 in non-presidential election years 1978-1998; (2), aged 20-23 in non-presidential election years 1978-
1998; and (3), aged 18-21 in presidential election years 1980-2000. Column 4 is the same sample as (3)
excluding years 1988 and 2000 when no incumbent President ran due to term limitations.
6)“Eligible to Vote” is a dummy variable for the survey participant being in the older age group in the
ages compared line. This variable changes meanings for the diﬀerent regressions since they test diﬀerent
age groups in diﬀerent types of election years. The base regression makes the standard comparison: Two
years after presidential election year i, how do presidential attitudes vary with voting eligibility at the last
election. Column (2) is the BASE regression with a changed age group comparison. This regression tests to
see if results (which we do not expect to be present) show up if we compare two contiguous age groups, both
of which were able to vote in the presidential election two years ago. This placebo disproves the critique that
such a diﬀerence is due only to the diﬀerence in ages and no to the implied voting eligibility. Column (3)
keeps the age groups compared the same as the BASE and simply changes the sample year to the presidential
election year (1980-2000) in the same period. This placebo tests for results (which we dont expect to ﬁnd)
if we change the context of the election years. In this test, two years ago, the older group was able to vote,
but it was not a presidential election. The absence of results indicates it is not the mere change in voting
ability that is a key factor, but rather the voting for the candidate in question.Table VIIb: Voting Eligibilty and Attitudes:
Using Demographics to Predict Vote
Speciﬁcation OLS IV IV
Eligible*party 8.392
(3.946)
Eligible to Vote -5.118 -10.668 -8.131
(2.841) (5.392) (3.596)








Would Have Voted for President2 23.343
(4.426)
First Stage of IV Includes – No Yes
Political Party as Regressor
Observations 554 554 554
Adjusted R
2 0.209 0.185 0.268
NOTES:
1)Data Source is the National Election Studies (NES) Survey 1948-2002 cumula-
tive data set. Sample is survey respondents aged 18-21 from the non-presidential
election years 1978-1998
2)The dependent variable is a “feeling” thermometer (scale 1-100 with 100 being
more positive) on the President of the survey year.
3)All regressions include year and state ﬁxed eﬀects.
4)“Eligible to Vote” is a dummy variable for whether the respondent was able
(by age) to vote in the previous election two years ago and “Same Party as
President” is a dummy matching self-reported political party aﬃliation to the
President’s party.
5)These regressions are the second stage regressions of the instrumental variables
approach to voting eligibilty and attitudes. (Stage 1 discussed in table Va) In the
IV approach, we exclude demographic controls (including race dummies) from the
speciﬁcation since these factors are accounted for in the predicted vote variable
obtained from stage 1 coeﬃcient estimates. Column 1 shows the results of the
basic speciﬁcation using the OLS approach but without the demographic controls
in order to have a matching baseline comparison the the IV regressions. Column
2 shows the results of the speciﬁcation using the presidential vote variable pre-
dicted by the stage 1 speciﬁcation that DOES NOT include political party as a
stage 1 regressor. Column 3 shows the IV regression using the presidential vote
variable predicted by the stage 1 speciﬁcation that DOES include political party
as a regressor.Table VIII: Placebo Tests: Using Demographics to Predict Vote
Age Placebo Year Placebo Year Placebo
Time Relative to Two Years Post Presidential Presidential
Presidential Election Presidential Election Election Year Election Year
Sample Years: 1978-1998 1980-2000 1980-2000
ex. 1988, 2000
Ages Compared 20/21 vs. 22/23 18/19 vs. 20/21 18/19 vs. 20/21
Speciﬁcation OLS IV IV OLS IV IV OLS IV IV
Eligible*party -4.03 -2.78 -3.87
(3.17) (4.27) (5.20)
Eligible to Vote 3.156 2.784 2.866 3.056 5.827 3.024 4.850 4.887 5.812
(2.551) (4.917) (3.313) (3.287) (5.594) (4.168) (3.799) (6.231) (4.754)
Same Party as 21.014 27.087 26.138
President (2.544) (3.356) (4.083)
Eligible*Pres. -1.88 -5.99 0.03
vote1 (7.94) (9.10) (11.02)
Would Have Voted 34.471 40.868 34.844
for President1 (6.036) (7.791) (9.484)
Eligible*Pres. -3.21 -1.67 -5.52
vote2 (4.95) (5.95) (7.29)
Would Have Voted 34.299 41.335 41.527
for President2 (3.746) (4.789) (5.747)
1st Stage of IV Uses – No Yes – No Yes – No Yes
Pol. Party as Regressor
Observations 695 695 695 469 469 469 341 341 341
Adjusted R
2 0.217 0.172 0.267 0.27 0.203 0.347 0.271 0.192 0.327
Concept Tested: Both Group No election two No election two
Eligible to Vote Years Prior Years Prior
NOTES:
1)Data Source is the National Election Studies (NES) Survey 1948-2002 cumulative data set.
2)The dependent variable is a “feeling” thermometer (scale 1-100 with 100 being more positive) on the President of
the survey year.
3)All regressions include year and state ﬁxed eﬀects.
4)“Same Party as President” is a dummy matching self-reported political party aﬃliation to the president’s party.
5)Sample years and age composition vary by placebo type. AGE placebo regressions (1-3) are comprised of survey
participants aged 20-23 in non-presidential election years 1978-1998; YEAR placebos (4-6), aged 18-21 in presidential
elction years 1980-2000. Regressions 7-9 are the same sample as the YEAR placebos (4-6) excluding years 1988 and
2000 when no incumbent President ran due to term limitations.
6)“Eligible to Vote” is a dummy variable for the survey participant being in the older age group in the ages compared
line. This variable changes meanings for the diﬀerent regressions since they test diﬀerent age groups in diﬀerent
types of election years. The AGE placebos test to see if results (which we do not expect to be present) show up
if we compare two contiguous age groups, both of which were able to vote in the presidential election two years
ago. This placebo disproves the critique that such a diﬀerence is due only to the diﬀerence in ages and no to the
implied voting eligibility. The YEAR placebos compares ages 18,19 with 20,21 but changes the sample year to the
presidential election year (1980-2000) in the same period. This placebo tests for results (which we dont expect to
ﬁnd) if we change the context of the election years. In this test, two years ago, the older group was able to vote, but
it was not a presidential election. The absence of results indicates it is not the mere change in voting ability that is
a key factor, but rather the voting for the candidate in question.
7)The placebo tests are done here with the IV approach (see tables Va and Vb)Table X: Voting and Senatorial Attitudes
Is Senate Race in a Presidential Election Year?
Panel A: Sample divided by Years Since
Senator’s Last Election
Full Sample Senators Elected Senators Elected
Two Years Ago Four Years Ago
Elected*party 2.060 1.799 1.984
(0.774) (1.205) (1.036)
Elected in Presidential election year -1.357 -7.708 0.458
(0.723) (2.189) (1.657)
Same Party as Senator 8.908 9.102 9.016
(0.872) (0.958) (1.144)
Observations 14192 7283 6909
Adjusted R
2 0.121 0.141 0.12
Panel B: Sample divided by Eﬀect of Instrument
Measure at the Median
Low Diﬀerence High Diﬀerence
Elected*party 1.671 2.429
(1.092) (0.948)
Elected in Presidential election year? -1.289 -1.288
(0.938) (0.934)






1)Data Source is the National Election Studies (NES) Survey 1948-2002 cumulative data set.
2)The dependent variable is a “feeling” thermometer (scale 1-100 with 100 being more positive) on the
senator in question.
3)All regressions include year, state, and age ﬁxed eﬀects as well as demographic controls.
4)The regressions show the eﬀect of the type of election year in which a senator was elected on survey
respondents’ senatorial attitudes. The sample is survey respondents from the national election years 1978-
1998. The regression is run separately for senators elected 2 and 4 years ago (from the survey time), as well
as the pooled sample. “Elected in Pres. election year” is a dummy for whether a senator (2 or 4 years ago)
was elected in a presidential election year. Presumably these election years are more highly publicized and
have higher voter turnouts.
5)Data is clustered on the state level.
6)In the pooled sample, some respondents have two observations, one for a senator elected two years ago
and one for the senator elected 4 years ago.
7)The sample is divided into 2 subsamples in panel B according to whether the observation has a value
above or below median for its calculated variable “eﬀect of instrument” The instrument eﬀect measure is
constructed as follows: We use a dprobit model to estimate the eﬀect of demographic characteristics (with
state ﬁxed eﬀects) on the probability of voting, separately for presidential and nonpresidential election years.
The coeﬃcient estimates are then used to predict voting probability for each individual in a presidential
and non-presidential election year. The diﬀerence of this predicted likelihood of voting is our “eﬀect of
instrument” variable.